The deficit in the federal budget was 9% of GDP in 2010,
and on December 1 of that year
we were told by
Erskine Bowles
and
Alan Simpson, co-chairs of
the President’s
National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform,
that there was a
$5.4 trillion unfunded mandate in the
Social Security
system that
must be dealt with.
The last time we were told something like
this was back in 1983
when the federal deficit was
6.0% of GDP in the aftermath of the 1981-1982
recession, following the
1981
Reagan tax cuts, and at the beginning of Reagan's
anti Soviet defense buildup. At that time, the Social
Security trust funds were dwindling, and Social Security was in danger of
running out of money. In the midst of that fiscal mess, President Reagan
established the
Greenspan Commission to reform Social Security.
In accordance with the
recommendations of the Greenspan
Commission, Congress agreed to
-
Increase the payroll taxes paid by self
employed individuals.
-
Increase the retirement age from 65 to 67
by 2022.
-
Accelerate previously scheduled payroll
tax increases.
-
Require that 50% of the Social Security
benefits received by higher income beneficiaries be taxed and paid into the
Social Security trust fund.
-
Expand Social Security coverage to
nonprofit and newly hired federal employees.
Congress also made a number of
additional changes that, when combined with previously
scheduled payroll tax and income cap increases, not only dealt with the trust
fund problem, but changed Social Security from a
pay-as-you-go system in which
the money received by current beneficiaries is paid by current workers, to a
partial-advanced-funding system in which the current workers prepaid a portion of
their own retirement, Medicare, disability, and death benefits as they also
paid
for the benefits of the current beneficiaries. (SSA)
As a result, Social Security has had an annual surplus since 1984—a surplus
that increased the Social Security
Old-Age Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) trust fund to $2.6 trillion by 2011 with an additional $0.3 trillion in the
Medicare and supplementary medical insurance trust funds as well.
This $2.9 trillion represents the prepayment of the current
working generations for their own retirement, medical, disability, and death
benefits—payments they made into these trust funds while they fully supported
(paid for) the retirement, medical, disability, and death benefits of the
generations that went before. And what happened to this $2.9 trillion? It
was placed in the safest investment on Earth: United States government bonds
backed by the full faith and credit of the United States of America. Why?
Not only because this is the safest investment on Earth, but because there was
no acceptable alternative way to invest these funds.
If the Social Security Administration were to invest in
non-government securities, it would involve the federal government in the
private securities markets in a massive way. The potential for corruption
with so much money involved was daunting, so much so that virtually no one
thought this was a good idea. At the same time, the idea that these funds be
divided into private accounts and invested in private securities by private
individuals was also deemed unacceptable. This would make them vulnerable to
the vagaries of the private-securities markets, and, as such, would defeat the
central purpose of the Social Security System.
Social Security was created to provide a system of
government guaranteed social insurance that is not dependent on the private-securities markets. It was the lack of such a system following the financial
disaster in 1929 that inspired the Social Security System in the first place.
What's more, the idea that the trust funds should have been invested in
private securities was put to the test in the 2000s. It is only because these
funds were invested in government bonds that they survived the stock market
crash of the early 2000s and the financial crisis of 2008.
The baby boomer retirement problem is explained in
The 2011 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance and Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds.
A concise statement of this problem can be found in the Trustees' message to
the public in the summary of this report:
Social Security expenditures exceeded the program’s
non-interest income in 2010 for the first time since 1983. . . . This deficit
is expected to shrink to about $20 billion for years 2012-2014 as the economy
strengthens. After 2014, cash deficits are expected to grow rapidly as the
number of beneficiaries continues to grow at a substantially faster rate than
the number of covered workers. Through 2022 . . . redemptions will be less
than interest earnings, [and] trust fund balances will continue to grow. After
2022, trust fund assets will be redeemed in amounts that exceed interest
earnings until trust fund reserves are exhausted in 2036 . . . . Thereafter,
tax income would be sufficient to pay only about three-quarters of scheduled
benefits through 2085. (SSA)
The Trustees further explain in this message that
Program costs equaled roughly 4.2 percent of GDP in 2007,
and are projected to increase gradually to 6.2 percent of GDP in 2035 and then
decline to about 6.0 percent of GDP by 2050 and remain at about that level. (SSA)
This is what all of the fuss is about:
-
If we do nothing, the current payroll tax structure and
trust fund is expected to carry the system into 2036 at which point the trust fund
will be exhausted and payroll taxes will cover only 75% of the promised
benefits. At that point either taxes will have to be raised or
benefits cut to make up the difference.
-
The annual costs of Social Security benefits were 4.2% of
GDP in 2007 and are expected to increase to 6.2% in
2035, then decline to 6.0% by 2050 and thereafter. This means that in
order to maintain benefits, the proportion of GDP devoted to Social Security
benefits must increase by 2.0% of GDP (6.2-4.2=2.0) between 2007 and 2035
and decrease thereafter by 0.2% of GDP between 2035 and 2050 for a net
increase of 1.8% of GDP from 2007 through 2050.
Where's the crisis? According to the Trustee’s report, the
Social Security trust fund is expected to continue to increase until 2022, and
Social Security is fully funded until 2036. Social Security benefits must
increase by 2% of GDP by 2035, which would not seem like much of a problem
since the United Sates is one of the wealthiest countries on Earth.
Increasing Social Security benefits by 2% of GDP between now and 2035 should
not be a major problem.
What's more, the trustees assume in their report that over
the next 75 years productivity, as measured by output produced per hour of
labor, will increase in the United States at an annual rate of
1.7%. This is the average rate of productivity growth
for the past forty years, and if productivity continues to grow at this rate
it means, through the magic of compounding, our economy will be 50% (1.017
multiplied by itself 25 times = 1.52) more productive in 2035 than it was in
2010. Even if productivity only grows by the worst case scenario considered
in the trustees’ report,
1.3% a year, we will still be almost 40% (1.013
multiplied by itself 25 times = 1.38) more productive in 2035. Why should we
believe that an increase of Social Security benefits equal to 2% of GDP
between now and 2035 is going to be a crushing burden on society in a world in
which the labor force that produces that GDP will be able to produce 40% to
50% more per hour of work than we do today? (Baker)
It's time to step back, take a deep breath, and remember
what we are talking about here. We are talking about increasing the share of
GDP that is devoted to the payment of Social Security benefits from 4.2% today
to 6.2% by 2035, then a decline in this share to 6.0% by 2050. This is a net
increase of only 2.0% of GDP over the next twenty-five years. At the same time,
productivity is supposed to increase 40% to 50% by 2035. This is the economic
problem posed by the baby boomers' retirement, a problem that most certainly
must be dealt with, but it is not a problem that portends a budget crisis that
will require drastic changes in the Social Security System to solve.
Figure 1, which plots federal expenditures as a percent of GDP from
1960 through 2013, should help to put this problem in perspective.
Source:
Source:
Office of Management and Budget. (1.2)
As is indicated in this figure, the average
of federal expenditure as a percent of GDP during the 1980s (22.2%) was 2
percentage points above the average in the 2000s (20.3%). In other
words, an increase in Social Security benefits equal to 2% of GDP by 2035
would be the equivalent of taking us back to where we were in the 1980s in
terms of the federal budget. This would hardly require a dramatic change
in the American way of life, especially since productivity today is
40%
to 50% greater than it was in the 1980s and is expected to be 40% to 50%
greater in 2035 than it is today. What’s the big deal about the baby boomers
increasing Social Security payments by 2% of GDP between 2010
and 2035 in a world in which output, and, hence, real income per worker is expected to be 40% to 50%
greater than it is today?
It is essential to recognize, however, that even though the
existence of a $2.6 trillion trust fund goes a long way toward solving the
funding problem the baby boomers present to the Social Security
Administration, it adds nothing toward solving the fiscal problem faced by the
federal government. The reason is that the Greenspan Commission’s
partial-advanced-funding scheme does not change the fiscal situation of the government when
it comes time for the baby boomers to retire.
Back
in the 1980s, the
Reagan Tax Cuts led to huge
deficits in the federal budget that were not brought under control until the
1990s. One of the mechanisms that helped to bring these deficits under
control was the
increase payroll taxes paid by
working people as the Social Security System was
converted from a
pay-as-you-go system to a
partial-advanced-funding system. As was noted
above, since the mid 1980s
Social Security has had an annual
surplus, a surplus that increased the Social Security OASDI trust fund by $2.6 trillion. These funds were, in
turn, lent to the federal government
to help finance its general expenditures, to the effect that by 2001
the money
borrowed from the Social Security System’s trust funds in that year alone
amounted to 8.75% of the federal
budget.
The problem is, as the baby boomers began to retire
in the early 2000s, the amount of cash available to be borrowed from the
Social Security System began to dwindle, and in 2010 there was no cash left to
borrow even though the Social Security System still had a surplus in that
year. The reason is that even though there was a surplus in the budget
for Social Security in that year, the amount of cash the system took in from payroll
taxes was less than the amount of cash it paid out in benefits and costs.
This situation is explained in the passage from the Trustee's Report
quoted above:
Social Security expenditures exceeded the program’s
non-interest income in 2010 for the first time since 1983. . . .Through 2022 .
. . redemptions will be less than interest earnings, [and the] trust fund
balances will continue to grow. After 2022, trust fund assets will be
redeemed in amounts that exceed interest earnings. . . (TRSUM)
This means that in 2010 the government could no longer simply credit the
interest it owed the Social Security System to its account and borrow its surplus cash since there was no surplus cash left to borrow.
There was a cash deficit in the Social Security systems accounts, and
the federal government was forced to pay a portion of the interest it owed the
system in cash in order to fund this cash deficit.
As a result, since 2010 the federal government has been
forced to pay a portion of its interest obligation to the Social Security
System in cash in order for the Social Security System to pay its benefits and
administrative costs in cash. At the same time, the amount of money the federal government owes the Social
Security trust funds each year continues to grow because the amount of cash the federal
government has been forced to pay into the Social Security System each year
has been less than the amount of interest that accrues each year on the debt
the federal government owes to the system. The difference must be
credited to the Social Security System's trust fund which, in turn, increases
the trust fund.
This situation is expected to continue through 2022 when
the Social Security System's cash deficit is expected to equal the
amount of interest the government owes the system in that year. At that point the Social Security
trust fund is expected to peak, and from then on the trust fund is expected
to fall as the federal government is forced to redeem the government
bonds in the Social Security trust fund (as well as pay the interest that
accrues each year on its remaining debt to the Social Security trust fund) in
cash in order for the Social Security System to
meet its obligation to pay its administrative costs and benefit payments to the baby boomers
in cash.
There are only two ways the federal government can come
up with the cash needed to pay the interest on its debt to the Social
Security System and to begin paying back the principal it borrowed from
working people: It can either raise taxes or borrow the needed funds. If it
doesn’t raise taxes, it will have to borrow, and
it can’t borrow without
increasing the national debt. The only alternative is for the federal
government to default on its obligations to the baby boomers by reducing their
Social Security benefits.
Thus, when it comes to making up the difference between
payroll tax receipts taken in and benefits paid out it makes no difference
whether there is a trust fund or not. In either case, the government must
either borrow or tax to make up this difference. As a result, the trust fund
has no effect on the fiscal situation facing the government when the benefits
owed the baby boomers come due.[1]
But if prepaying a portion of their Social Security
benefits did not contribute to a solution to the government's fiscal problem
when the baby boom generation retires, just what did the Greenspan Commission
accomplished? What it accomplished was an increase in the taxes paid by
working people to support the general expenditures of the government. That
increase yielded the government $2.9 trillion from working people since 1983
that it would not have received if the Social Security System had stayed on a
pay-as-you-go basis. That's what prepaying a portion of the Social Security
benefits accomplished, and that's all it accomplished from the perspective of
the fiscal soundness of the government.
This is where the real crisis in Social Security lies, and
this is not an economic crisis. We are still talking about increasing
Social Security benefits by only 2% of GDP by 2035 in a situation where
increases in productivity is expected to increase output per worker by 40% or
50%. It is a moral and political
crisis, however, because our society has to decide how it is going to come up
with the funds necessary to make this adjustment or if it is going to not come
up with these funds and renege on its promise to the baby boomers. (Surowiecki)
The bipartisan
Moment of Truth report written by
Alan Simpson and
Erskine Bowles
is the end product of the President’s
National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. While this report
was formally rejected by the Commission, it puts forth a set of recommendations to deal with
our federal
deficit and debt problems in a comprehensive way, recommendations that have
gained a significant amount of political support. Of particular interest
in this report are the recommendations regarding Social Security, Medicare,
and revisions of the tax code.
Concerning Social Security, the Simpson-Bowles
recommendations are summarized in Figure 2.
Source:
Moment of Truth Report.
These recommendations contain five key elements
where the percentage in parentheses following each item indicates its
contribution toward eliminating the expected shortfall in Social Security
funding over the next seventy-five years:
-
Gradually phase in progressive changes to the benefit formula while
increasing the minimum benefit and adding a longevity benefit. (29%)
-
Index
retirement age and earliest eligibility age to increase with longevity.
(18%)
-
Use a
chained CPI rather than the standard CPI to adjust benefits for changes in
the cost of living. (26%)
-
Gradually increase the income cap to cover 90% of wage income. (35%)
-
Add
newly hired state and local government employees to the program after 2020.
(8%)
The first element in this list combines the first, second, and forth
items in Figure 2 where the savings are supposed to be achieved by
making the benefit payout system more progressive—that is, by lowering the
benefits paid to high income recipients while, at the same time, increasing
the benefits paid to low income recipients. The suggestion that these
savings are coming from making the system more progressive is rather
disingenuous, however, in that the savings come from a net cut in benefits, not from the fact that the resulting payout scheme is
more progressive. If the increase in benefits paid to low wage earners were
equal to the decrease in benefits paid to higher wage earners there would be
no savings from this adjustment in progressivity.
The second item obviously achieves the savings, without any
pretext, through a straightforward
across the board cut in benefits by increasing the
retirement age. The third also achieves the savings by cutting benefits by
way of a controversial change in the way the Social Security cost of living
adjustment is calculated. (WSJ
SGS) The last two achieve their savings by increasing
the payroll tax base.
Thus, when we do the math, we find that these
recommendations solve Social Security’s future revenue problem by cutting
benefits to cover 73% of the expected shortfall and by expanding the tax base
to cover an additional 43% of the shortfall. (Presumably, the redundant 16%
of savings is there to maintain the Social Security trust fund that will be
lent to the government.) According to
Simpson and
Bowles, if we accept their recommendations Social
Security will be on a sound financial footing for the next 75 years.
It is worth
noting, however, that if these recommendations are implemented they will have
the effect of converting Social Security from an insurance program in which
the benefits provide some protection against a catastrophic loss into a kind
of non-means-tested
welfare program for the elderly
in which there are hardly any benefits at all. The extent to which this
is so is indicated in Figure 3 which shows the expected payout under
the current law and how the payout structure would change under the
Simpson-Bowles recommendations.
Source:
www.StrengthenSocialSecurity.org,
Benefits Chart.
Under this scheme
benefits would fall by 47% for "'Maximum' Earners($106,800)", 39% for "'High'
Earners ($68,934)", 27% for "'Medium' Earners ($43,084)" and even "'Low
Earners' ($19,388)" would see a decrease.
Even worse, the Simpson-Bowles scheme proposes to fund this
program through the payroll tax. The payroll tax is one of the most
regressive taxes there is. It is levied only on earned income (income
received from wages and salaries) with no deductions and only minor
exemptions, and the total amount of earned income taxed is capped where
the cap in 2011 was $106,800. It is not levied on unearned income (income
received in the form of interest, dividends, capital gains, rent, and
corporate profits) or on earned income above the $106,800 cap. As a result,
virtually all of the income of low income families is subject to the Social
Security tax since virtually all of their income comes from wages and
salaries below the cap, while virtually none of the income of the wealthy is subject to this
tax since virtually all of their income is either above the cap on earned
income or comes from unearned income.
The payroll tax is hardly an equitable way to finance a
welfare type program. The burden of financing this sort of program should fall
heaviest on those who can afford to pay, not on the backs of the working poor
as is the case when the payroll tax is used. It makes sense to use a payroll
tax to finance an insurance program. It does not make sense to use a
payroll tax to finance a welfare-type program.
Our
multiple-payer, third-party,
fee-for-service payment healthcare system whereby healthcare providers decide
with patients what services to provide and how much to charge while insurance companies or
the government picks up the tab virtually guarantees continually increasing
costs. There is a powerful incentive to over prescribe in this system and
little incentive to deliver quality healthcare in a cost effective manner
since the decisions as to what to charge and how much to prescribe are made primarily by
providers.
To make matters
worse, rising healthcare costs virtually guarantee that a continually
increasing share of the healthcare costs will be passed on to the government
as the higher costs force people, especially those with poor health, out of the private
healthcare system. This is so because as people are forced out of the
system society must decide the extent to which the government should pick up
the tab for those who can no longer afford the cost of private healthcare.
To the extent the government picks up the tab, it reinforces the process of
third-party payment irrespective of cost that leads to the increasing costs
that forces people out of the private healthcare system in the first place.
To the extent the government does not pick up the tab, people who could
otherwise be saved are left to die or to suffer with maladies that could
otherwise be cured. This choice begs the question: How many poor
people who cannot afford to pay for the cost of healthcare should be allowed
to suffer or die—in the wealthiest country on Earth—in order to lower the
costs for those who can afford to pay?
There is no
optimal answer to this question that is in any sense humane, and our attempt
to find one over the past 75 years while at the same time attempting to hang
on to our archaic
multiple-payer, third-party,
fee-for-service payment system has caused the American
healthcare system to become the least efficient among the advanced
countries of the world. We rank
51th in terms of life expectancy,
51th in terms of infant mortality,
24th in terms of the availability of doctors,
25th in terms of mother’s health,
37th in terms of the overall performance of our healthcare system, and
at the same time, we spend more for healthcare
per person and as a
percent of GDP than any other country
in the world.
(OECD
OECD Charts
NYT
IOM
JAMA1
JAMA2
STC
WHO)
Over the past thirty years healthcare expenditures as
a percent of GDP have increased at the rate of 2.2% per year. At this
rate, expenditures as percent of GDP will double every 32 years.
Obviously something is going to give before this can occurred. The
only question is what: the government’s budget, employer sponsored health
insurance, or both?
The
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act has attempted to address this
rising healthcare cost problem, but while there are a number of cost saving
provisions in this bill,
the Affordable
Care Act hangs on to the fee-for-service, multi-third-party-payer model. There is
no
single-payer mechanism or
public-option plan provided for in this
act to provide a direct mechanism by which costs can be controlled. In
addition, the 85% payout restriction on insurance companies that is part of this
bill means that once insurance companies reach this limit they will only be able to increase their profits
in the aggregate
if healthcare costs increase, thereby, increasing what insurance companies
can make from their 15% cut. This does not exactly provide an
incentive for insurance companies or providers to hold down costs, and if
healthcare costs continue to grow the way they have in the past, the cost of
Medicare and
Medicaid, which together make up the largest single component of our
social insurance system today, will eventually become unbearable.
In dealing with
healthcare, the main thrust of the Simpson-Bowles recommendations is to
reduce healthcare costs by forcing healthcare recipients, both public and
private, to pay a larger proportion of the cost. But, as was noted
above, this plan can only
reduce costs to the extent it forces those who cannot afford the added costs
out of the healthcare system with all of the implications that has for the
health of our population; to the extent the government picks up the
tab for those who cannot afford the added cost there is no saving. This
plan is just more of the same kind of thing we have been doing for the past 65
years, and there is no reason to think the results will be different: rising
healthcare costs with a larger and larger portion of the tab being picked up
by the government.
What is particularly disturbing about the Simpson-Bowles
bipartisan plan for deficit reduction, however, is that while they recommend
massive cuts in Social Security and Medicare benefits, at the same time they
recommend the top marginal income tax rate paid by corporations and the
wealthy be cut from
35% to 28%, that the marginal income tax rate paid by
middle-income earners be set at
22%, and that the lowest income tax rate paid by the
not so wealthy be increased from
10% to 12%.
It these changes are passed into law, the combined
14.2% [2] employee/employer payroll tax rate plus the
income tax rate in the lowest income bracket will equal 26.3%—less than two
percentage points below the maximum marginal rate corporations and
multibillionaires will pay. Those in lower end of the middle tax bracket will
face a combined marginal rate of
36.2%—8.2 percentage points above the
marginal rate multibillionaires and corporations will pay. Even though
Simpson and
Bowles also recommend treating dividends and capital
gains as ordinary income and recommend a few other changes that will make the
tax code somewhat more progressive, there is something very wrong here.
There was a surplus in the federal budget equal to
2.4% of GDP in 2000 before the massive
2001-2003 Bush tax cuts, before the invasion of Iraq,
and before those who ran our
financial institutions devastated our economy. The
fiscal problems we face today are clearly the result of the Bush cut taxes
combined with the increases in defense expenditures squandered in Iraq and the
devastating recession brought on by
the fraudulent, reckless, and
irresponsible behavior of those in charge of our financial institutions. Social Security
and Medicare had nothing to do with this mess.
And yet—in the name of fiscal responsibility—Alan Simpson and
Erskine Bowles, acting as co-chairs of
the
National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, released their
Moment of Truth report in which they propose we 1) cut
Medicare benefits and increase the private cost of healthcare dramatically, 2)
convert Social Security into a welfare-type program paid for with payroll taxes in
order to avoid paying an increase in benefits equal to 2% of GDP, and, at the
same time, 3) give additional tax cuts to those at the top of the income
distribution, many of whom made fortunes out of the Iraq war and through
financing the housing bubble that devastated the economy of the entire world. And to add
insult to injury, we are also supposed to increase the taxes paid by those in
the lowest income tax bracket. This not only defies common sense, it
defies common decency.
The
Moment of Truth report released by the co-chairs of the
National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform does not deal with the deficit problem in a substantive
way. There is no discussion as to how the optimum level or quality
healthcare can be provided to the population in the most cost effective manner in
their report. No discussion as to how Social Security and Medicare can
be maintained as viable insurance programs. No discussion as to how the
optimum level of essential government services can be made available in their
most cost effective manner.
This report concentrates only on cutting government
services and lowering tax rates paid by the ultra wealthy. As a result,
it simply ignores obvious solutions
to our Social Security, healthcare, and fiscal problems—solutions that do not
entail emasculating Social Security and Medicare.
There are many ways to deal with the expected shortfall in Social Security
revenues needed to finance the benefits promised to the baby boomers that
would not involve drastic changes in the Social Security program. One would be to
-
Increase
the payroll cap to apply to 90% of covered earnings
as Congress intended back in 1977 or, perhaps, to an
even higher percentage.
-
Convert
the federal estate tax to a
dedicated Social Security tax that is credited
automatically to the Social Security trust fund.
-
Expand
the program to cover newly hired
state and local workers.
-
Implement
modest changes in payroll taxes and Social Security benefits, if needed, after
the above changes have been made and, perhaps, extend the payroll tax to
include unearned income and/or remove the income cap altogether.
Approaching the expected Social Security deficit problem in
this way would not require the draconian cuts in benefits put forth in the
Moment of Truth Report nor would it require draconian
payroll tax increases.
It is the rising cost of healthcare that poses the most serious fiscal
problem faced by the federal government, and, as has been noted above, every
advanced country in the world that has better health statistics and lower
healthcare costs than we do has abandoned the cost ineffective
multiple-third-party payment system for
a
single-payer universal healthcare system that provides government
subsidized healthcare for all—paid for through taxes—where costs are
controlled through government negotiated prices. They pay higher taxes than we
do, but their higher taxes are more than offset by the savings in insurance
premiums and lower healthcare costs—not to mention the fact that they are
healthier than we are, and they live longer than we do. (OECD
OECD Charts NYT
IOM JAMA1
JAMA2)
The simplest, most efficient, and most cost effective way
to provide a comparable system for the United States would be to extend the
Medicare program to the entire population. This program works, and the
institutions necessary to run it are already in place. It would take
very little effort to retool Medicare to meet the needs of the entire
population compared to the massive effort it is going to take to
implement the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
By 2000, increases in the Social Security trust fund was
adding over $150 billion a year in cash flow and deferred interest payments to
the government’s general fund, and it continued to do so for the next eight
years. From 1996 through 2008, the federal government relied on the
increase in the OASDI trust fund to finance over 6% of its outlays and, as was
noted above, this
reached a peak in 2001when the money
borrowed from the Social Security System’s trust funds in that year alone
amounted to 8.75% of the federal
budget.
Now that the baby boomers are starting to retire, this
source of revenue is coming to an end. While some of the interest the
government owes the Social Security System each year can still be simply added
to the System's trust funds, cash receipts from payroll taxes have fallen
below the cash benefits and administrative costs the Social Security System
must pay out. As a result, the government must either borrow the difference
or it must increase non-payroll taxes in order to pay that portion of the
interest it owes the Social Security System each year in cash to meet this
cash shortfall—if that’s what our government chooses to do. It also has the
option of reneging on its agreement with the baby boomers by reducing their
benefits or increasing the payroll taxes paid by their children and
grandchildren.
Even though there are a number of
simple fixes that will solve the Social Security baby boomer retirement
problem, and it would be fairly easy to fix our healthcare system, none of
these fixes will work if the federal government is not
made fiscally sound. These fixes can only work if we come up with
the funds needed to make them work while, at the same time, coming up
with the funds needed to provide the other government services the American
people demand.
What
this means is that, if we are to preserve Social Security, Medicare, and
provide for all of the other government services that are demanded by the
American people, we must raise taxes.
(Fieldhouse
Diamond Sides)
It will, of course, also be necessary to
reregulate our financial system if we are to keep our financial institutions
from creating the kinds of economic disasters that unregulated
financial
institutions have created
throughout history. At the very lease we must
-
reenact the
Glass-Steagall Act
to eliminate the kinds conflicts of interests inherent
in conglomerate mega-bank financial institutions,
break up those financial institutions
that are "too big to fail," and
provide for direct regulation of hedge
funds, over-the-counter derivatives, and the market for repurchase
agreements with the power to set margin requirements for repurchase
agreement loans and capital requirements for Credit Default Swaps.
These are the minimum actions
required to keep those in charge of our financial institutions from creating
in the future the kind of economic catastrophes they have created in the past when unrestrained by government regulation—the
kind of economic catastrophe we are in the midst of today.
Simply passing laws, however, is not
enough. Government regulation
begins with the
law, but it ends with the regulators. It was the belief in free-market
ideology that was the primary cause of the financial crisis we face today, not
the absence of legislation. The
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA) passed 1994
gave the Federal Reserve the absolute authority to regulate the mortgage
market. Enforcing the laws against predatory lending practices, enforcing
strict underwriting standards for mortgage loans, and setting maximum loan to
value ratios on mortgages would have prevented the housing bubble that came
into being in the 2000s. The Federal Reserve had the absolute authority to do
all of these things under HOEPA during the housing bubble, but the ideological faith in free
markets to regulate themselves on the part of regulators, the administrations,
and the Congress kept the Fed from doing so.
(Bair)
In addition,
the regulators could have
petitioned the government to bring
Money Market Mutual Funds,
Cash Management Accounts, and repurchase agreements
under the purview of depository regulators during the Reagan administration
and to extend the regulatory authority of the
Security and Exchange Commission
and
Commodity Futures Trading Commission to regulate
hedge funds and the markets for Credit Default Swaps during the Clinton
administration, but, again, ideology stood in the way.
Until the terribly
misguided view of reality embodied in the
failed nineteenth-century ideology
of free-market capitalism is replaced in the minds regulators,
administrations, Congress, and the body politic by a pragmatic view of
financial regulation that recognizes the need for the government to rein in
and control the speculative and fraudulent urges of the financial sector there
is little hope of our being able to survive the current crisis with our basic
social institutions intact or to avoid similar economic catastrophes in the
future.