Excerpt from:
Where Did All The Money Go?
Chapter 10: The
Crash of 2008
While the
financial system is generally secure so long as non-federal debt is backed
by profitable investments that are self financing or by incomes that are the
result of profitable investments, with a non-federal debt equal to 318% of
GDP—the point it had reached in 2007 as the financial system began to
founder—the transfer of income from debtor to creditor can be problematic.
Even a 3% average interest rate would require 9.5% of GDP to be transferred
when non-federal debt equals 318% of GDP and a 5% rate would require that
15.9% be transferred. That means an average interest rate of 5% on the $46
trillion non-federal debt that existed in 2007 would require a $2.3 trillion
transfer out of a gross income of $14.5 trillion. This kind of transfer from
debtors to creditors places a strain on the system even in the best of
times, and these were not the best of times.
The problem was, of course, that the non-federal debt created
after the
dotcom and
telecom bubbles collapsed in 2000 was not
backed by profitable investments or by incomes that were the result of
profitable investments. It was created in the midst of
a massive mortgage fraud that led to a
situation in which there were
$11 trillion worth of mortgages at the heart
of the $46 trillion worth of non-federal debt that existed in 2007—mortgages
on properties the prices of which had been inflated by the
housing bubble that the
subprime mortgage fraud had helped to create.
As a result, all mortgages were at risk, not just subprime mortgages, and
as the fallout from the
housing bubble’s bursting spread throughout
the financial system
the default rate on prime mortgages followed
the upward trend of the default rate on subprime mortgages. To make matters
worse, the worst of the worst of these mortgages were used to collateralize
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs) and sold to
hapless investors all over the world. (FCIC
WSFC
NYU)
The anti-regulation fervor of the times,
combined with the freewheeling, cowboy finance this fervor had engendered
also led to the unrestricted creation of hundreds of trillions of dollars of
over-the-counter
derivatives. These derivatives had the effect
of turning the financial system into a worldwide casino in that they made it
possible for speculators to wager unfathomable amounts of money on the
future outcomes of economic events without the benefit of an
exchange or
clearinghouse to inform or protect the public
or to defend the system against the cascading effects of defaults. In the
process, speculators not only placed the solvency of themselves and their
counterparties at risk, they placed the solvency of the entire financial
system at risk. (FCIC)
The lack of regulation in the
over-the-counter
derivatives markets was particularly acute
when it came to the market for
Credit Default Swaps
(CDSs) which allowed speculators to obtain multiple contracts to insure
assets they did not own against default. This meant that the losses caused
by a default on an asset that was insured multiple times would be multiplied
by the number of times the asset was insured with the complicating factor of
the possibility of default on the part of the writers (insurers) of the CDSs
that insured the asset.
Federal deposit insurance was sufficient to prevent a run on
depository institutions, but this did not prevent a run on the rest of the
system. Much of the financial system had been taken over by
shadow banks—financial institutions that
operated like banks in holding long-term assets financed by short-term
liabilities—that were, for the most part, outside the purview of the
financial regulatory system with very little restriction on their leverage.
Shadow banks were extremely vulnerable to a run when the crisis began since,
unlike depository institutions, shadow banks had no insured source of funds
or guaranteed
lender-of-last-resort protection. And the
shadow banking system had become significantly larger than the traditional
banking system by the time the financial system began to breakdown. Shadow
banks held well over
$12 trillion dollars worth of assets in 2007
whereas the total value of all of the assets held by the regulated banking
system in that year stood at
$10 trillion.
As we saw in Chapters 5 and Chapter 6, financial institutions
that hold long-term assets financed by short-term liabilities are
particularly vulnerable to financial panics that lead to economic
catastrophes because, in the midst of a panic, the short-term funding of
these institutions dries up faster than their long-term assets mature. As a
result, financial institutions that use this kind of funding without an
insured source of funds or guaranteed
lender-of-last-resort
protection can find themselves in a situation where in order to meet their
short-term obligations they are forced to dump their long-term assets on the
market. This distress selling of assets can, in turn, causes asset prices
throughout the system to fall which threatens the solvency of all
institutions that hold similar long-term assets. The resulting fall in asset
prices can also make it impossible for some to meet their short-term
obligations, particularly when leverage is high, and force them to default
on their short-term debts. This, in turn, reinforces the panic
We also saw in Chapters 5 and Chapter 6 how leverage tends to
increase during prosperous times in an unregulated financial system.
Leverage was, in fact, dangerously high at the beginning of the current
crisis, even among those institutions that fell within what was left of our
regulatory system. This was primarily a result of three significant changes
in the regulatory rules that were promulgated in the early to mid 2000s:
The first was
promulgated in 2001 by the
OCC,
Fed,
FDIC, and
OTS. It liberalized the rules that
allowed depository institutions to set up
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) to
secure financing in the
Asset-backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) and
Repurchase Agreement markets. (JPR)
The second was contained in the same
promulgation as the first. It allowed depository institutions to
hold less capital reserves against highly rated investment
assets—AAA-rated
Asset-Backed Securities such as
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBSs) and
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), for example—than against
ordinary loans. (JPR)
The third
was promulgated in 2004 by the
SEC. It allowed the major investment banks to set their own capital
requirements as determined by their in-house risk assessment models. (NYT)
These rule changes were the direct result of the ideological
insanity of the times, and the effects of these changes were disastrous. By
transferring long-term assets off their books to
Special Purpose Vehicles, depository
institutions were able to use their SPVs to finance their operations by
using the transferred assets as collateral for the
Asset-backed Commercial Paper
or repurchase agreements issued or undertaken by their SPVs. Since the SPVs
were outside the regulatory purview of the government, the SPVs were able to
leverage the financing of their assets far beyond what the regulated
depository institutions would have been legally able to do if they had kept
the assets on their books.
Reducing the capital requirements of those banks that held
triple-A rated assets not only led to a situation where 50% of all AAA-rated
Asset-Backed Securities remained within the
financial system, either held directly on the books of banks or in their
off-the-books SPV conduits, it led to a situation where these assets were
financed at a much higher leverage than would have otherwise been possible.
(FCIC
WSFC
NYU)
Allowing investment banks to determine their own capital
requirements led to a situation in which the five largest investment
banks—Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and
Morgan Stanley—had leveraged their capital 40 to 1 by 2007, and, as we saw
in Chapter 5, this meant that a mere 2.5% fall in the value of their assets
would wipe out their entire equity. At the same time, the two
GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, had
leveraged their capital 75 to 1 meaning that a mere 1.4% fall in the value
of their assets would drive them into insolvency. (FCIC)
This kind of leverage placed the solvency of the entire financial system at
risk when the crisis came as the assets created and held within the
financial system began to lose their value.
The fact that:
1.
many of the assets held by banks were held off
their books,
2.
the leverage of banks and shadow banks had been
allowed to grow beyond any sense of reason, and
3.
there existed over
$500 trillion worth of over-the-counter derivatives that had been
allowed to come into being in an unregulated market without the protections
provided by an
exchange or
clearinghouse
created a situation in which no one knew which institutions
were at risk or which would survive as the prime rate went from 4.3% in 2004
to 6.2% in 2005 to 8.0% in 2006 and remained at 8% into 2007.
To make matters worse, as was noted in Chapter 4, the
resurrection of the
failed nineteenth-century ideology of
Free-Market Capitalism that led to the deregulation of our financial system
was not an exclusively American phenomenon. It had been promulgated all over
the world by institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund. The result was
not only financial deregulation and a housing bubble in the United States
but
in many countries in Europe and
elsewhere around the world.
As a result, the crisis that was about to explode in the American financial
system in September of 2008 was destined to create a worldwide economic
catastrophe.
Subprime mortgages went from 8% of mortgage originations in
2003 to 20% in 2005, and 70% of these mortgages hybrid
Adjustable-Rate Mortgages (ARMs) with teaser
rates for the first two or three years that would reset to a higher rate
thereafter. At the same time, many
Alt-A mortgages were issued with
little or no documentation and with very high loan to value ratios,
often as high as 100%. The profits made on these mortgages came from the
fees that were charged for originating them—fees that were added to the
principle of the loan—rather than from the interest rates that were charged
on these loans. These mortgages were specifically designed to be refinanced
and, thereby, to generate more fees since those who received these kinds of
mortgages would often be unable to make the larger payments when the
interest rates reset if the mortgages were not refinanced. (FCIC
WSFC
NYU)
Hybrid ARMs with teaser rates were a moneymaking machine for
mortgage originators since each time the mortgage was refinanced new fees
were generated and added to the principle of the loan. They also seemed to
be a safe bet for the mortgage holder as well, so long as housing prices
were rising. If the mortgagor was unable to make the payment or refinance
the mortgage when the interest rate reset, the mortgage holder would be able
to foreclose and take possession of the property in a rising market. And as
we saw in Chapter 1,
financial institutions managed to accumulate over $700 billion dollars in
profits from 2001 through 2007 in excess of what they would have received if
there had been no
housing bubble.
The problem was that in 2006 housing prices stopped rising.
Figure 10.1 shows the Case-Shiller home price indices from 1900
through 2013, both in nominal terms and in real terms, that is, after
adjusting for inflation. This figure shows the phenomenal increase in home
prices that occurred during the
housing bubble as the
rate of housing price increases accelerated dramatically beginning in 1998.
The nominal value of houses more than doubled from 1998 through 2005 as
their real value increased by 80%. This figure also shows how this market
crashed after its peak in the second quarter of 2006 and prices began to
fall.
Source:
Case-Shiller Home Price Indices.
As a result, many of those with
ARMs were not able to refinance their mortgages or make the payments when
the interest rates reset, and delinquencies and defaults on these mortgages
rose. The fall in housing prices also meant that when home owners defaulted
on their mortgage debts, the mortgage holders would no longer be able to
foreclose and take possession of the homes in a rising market and would find
themselves holding an increasing inventory of properties that could only be
sold at loss.
By the end of 2006 it was apparent that the party was over as
hundreds of the smaller independent subprime mortgage lenders had gone out
of business along with some that were not so small. (NYU)
In commenting on
Ownit Mortgage Solutions demise on December 7,
2006
Bloomberg noted that
Ownit joins Ameriquest Mortgage
Co., Countrywide Financial Corp., H&R Block Inc.'s Option One, BNC Mortgage
Inc. and other lenders in shutting operations or laying off employees as the
U.S. housing market slows. Delinquencies are rising, home prices are falling
and borrowers of
Adjustable-Rate Mortgages
are facing higher monthly payments.
When, on April 2, 2007
New Century Financial, the second largest
subprime lender in the country, filed for bankruptcy it was clear that the
subprime housing market had come to an end. (FCIC)
The seriousness of the situation did not begin to sink in, however, until
the end of June when two of Bear Stearns's hedge funds began to collapse.
When
Merrill Lynch seized some $800 million worth
of collateral underlying its repurchase agreements with Bear's
High-Grade Structured Credit Fund Merrill
found that it couldn't sell the CDOs it had seized without taking a loss on
its investment. This was, of course, a relatively piddling sum in the grand
scheme of things, but the fact that $800 million worth of collateral could
not be sold at a price that would cover the cost of the loans made under
Merrill's repurchase agreements
called into question the viability of the entire market for repurchase
agreements.
Then the downgrades began. On July 10,
2007 Moody’s announced a substantial downgrade of 399 subprime
Mortgage-Backed Securities and within days Standard & Poor’s followed
suit by downgrading an additional 498 securities. (FCIC)
This marked the beginning of
the run on the shadow banking system that gradually built up steam until it
eventually overwhelmed the traditional banking system of the entire world.
On August 9, 2007 the largest French bank, BNP Paribas,
was forced to suspend redemptions on three of
its SPV conduits to the
Asset-backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) market.
In response to this news, ABCP markets began to freeze as investors came to
realize that these markets were collateralized by assets of questionable
value. The lack of government regulation of bank sponsored SPVs made it
impossible for investors to know the extent of the problem or which banks
were sound and which were not. No one knew which could be trusted, and the
inter-bank lending market froze.
As a result, central banks all over the world were forced to pump liquidity
into the system.
On
August 9, 2007 the European Central Bank (ECB)
injected 95 billion euros into the Euro Zone (EZ) banking system. On
August 10 the Federal Reserve announced it
would take the steps necessary to provide liquidity in the financial markets
and on
August 17 cut its discount rate by 50
basis points as it announced a change in "the
Reserve Banks' usual practices to allow the provision of term financing for
as long as 30 days, renewable by the borrower." The Fed also broadened the
kinds of assets it would accept as collateral for its loans to depository
institutions and continued to cut its discount rate and expand liquidity
throughout the fall as the hundreds of subprime lenders began to liquidate.
On
September 14 the
Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the
Bank of England would "provide
liquidity support for Northern Rock, the United Kingdom’s fifth-largest
mortgage lender."
In response to the evaporation of short-term funding for
bank-sponsored SPVs, on
December 12 the Federal
Reserve announced the first of its special lending facilities:
The
Federal Reserve Board announces the creation of a
Term Auction Facility
(TAF) in which fixed amounts of term funds will be auctioned to depository
institutions against a wide variety of collateral.
The purpose of this facility was to allow banks to either
extend credit to their SPVs or take their SPVs’ assets back onto their
books. Had the Fed not done this the assets of bank sponsored SPVs would
have been forced on to the market which would have precipitated a dramatic
fall in asset prices. At the same time the Fed announced:
The
FOMC authorizes temporary reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines) with
the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB). The Fed
states that it will provide up to $20 billion and $4 billion to the ECB and
SNB, respectively, for up to 6 months. (SLFED)
The
currency swap lines were arranged to provide
liquidity to
foreign financial institutions that had borrowed short term in the American
money market to finance the purchase of dollar
denominated assets. Without this support of foreign institutions by the
Federal Reserve those institutions would have been forced, for lack of
dollar funding, to dump their dollar denominated assets on to the market.
This would have driven the prices of these assets down which, in turn, would
have threatened the solvency of American institutions that held the same
kinds of assets. (Cecchetti)
These actions provided a temporary reprieve for our major
depository institutions, but they did little to assist the investment banks
in their attempts to cope with the crisis. As the run on the investment
banks and their SPVs continued it eventually reached a climax on
March 14, 2008 when the Federal Reserve
announced its willingness to support a takeover of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan
Chase and on
March 24 guaranteed
$29 billion of Bear's assets
against loss to JP Morgan Chase in order to facilitate the takeover.
Then, on
March 16, 2008 the Federal Reserve had
announced its
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) whereby
the Fed agreed to "extend credit to primary dealers at the primary credit
rate against a broad range of investment grade securities." (FED)
Primary Dealers are those institutions that deal directly with the Federal
Reserve in implementing its open market policy,
and, not coincidently, included all of the major investment banks that were
under siege at the time. This was a radical departure from traditional
Federal Reserve policy. The Federal Reserve was created to provide liquidity
to depository institutions, not investment banks, and, as was noted in
Chapter 7, the Fed was only able to create this lending facility under a
little known emergency provision,
Section 13(3) (12 U.S.C. §343,
buried within the
Federal Reserve Act.
Unfortunately, the change in policy associated with the creation of this
facility came too late to save Bear Stearns.
The Federal Reserve continued to lower its discount rate and
expand its lending facilities to banks throughout the spring and summer of
2008 in the hope that these stopgap measures would make it possible to avoid
an economic catastrophe. Unfortunately, this was not to be. (NYT)
The system reached its breaking point in September of 2008 when the federal
government was forced to take over
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on September 7 and
allowed
Lehman Brothers to file for bankruptcy on September 15.
By the time the government took over
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and allowed
Lehman Brothers to file for bankruptcy there
were over
$600 trillion worth of
over-the-counter derivatives outstanding, and no one knew how many of the
issuers of these derivative contracts would survive or which would go bust
and leave their counterparties holding the bag. Nor did anyone know who
would ultimately be on the hook for the inevitable defaults on the
non-federal debt outstanding—debt that had grown to $47.2 trillion by 2008
as GDP peaked at $14.7 trillion.
Prior to Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy there was some hope
within the financial community that somehow the government would muddle
through and save the system. When Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail those
hopes were dashed, and a panic ensued that caused financial markets to
freeze all over the world. On the day Lehman filed, the
Bank of America announced its agreement to purchase Merrill Lynch,
and by the end of the week Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, seeing the
handwriting on the wall, made arrangements to become bank holding companies
thereby subjecting themselves to Federal Reserve supervision. At that point
all of the major investment banks
had either gone bust, been taken over by a depository institution, or had
become a depository institution in the hope that by placing themselves under
the protective purview of the Federal Reserve they would be able to survive
the carnage.
The day after Lehman filed, the Fed guaranteed an
$85 billion loan to American International
Group (AIG) to prevent it from defaulting on some $79 billion worth of
Credit Default Swaps that AIG had sold without setting aside the capital
needed in the event the buyers of these insurance contracts had to be
compensated. That same day the
Reserve Primary Money Fund "broke the buck"
(meaning that value of its assets fell below the value of the money
investors had deposited in the fund) due to its losses on Lehman Brothers
commercial paper and medium-term notes. This set off a run on the $3
trillion
Money Market Mutual Fund (MMMF) industry which
is one of the primary purchasers of the commercial paper used by
corporations to obtain financing for inventories and to meet payrolls. (NYU)
In response, on
September 19 the Federal Reserve announced the
creation of the
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
(AMLF), and the
Treasury announced a program to make available
$50 billion to guarantee investments in
Money Market Mutual Funds. Both of these moves
were designed to keep the run on MMMFs from disrupting the flow of funds to
the real sector of the economy. (FRB)
Within five days of Lehman's filing the situation had become
desperate. On
September 20 the Treasury submitted a proposal
to Congress that would authorize the Treasury to purchase $700 billion worth
of assets from financial institutions in order to get these assets off their
books. The stock markets were thrown into chaos nine days later when
Congress
rejected this proposal. On October 3, a
revised version of the Treasury's proposal was signed into law which
authorized the $700 billion the Treasury had requested and created the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to
administer the distribution of these funds. Over the following year and a
half some $432 billion of these funds were subsequently used to recapitalize
various financial institutions, provide additional funding for AIG, provide
foreclosure aid, and to fund the reorganization of General Motors and
Chrysler as they worked their way through the bankruptcy court. (FCIC)
On
October 7 the Federal Reserve created yet
another funding facility, the
Commercial Paper Funding Facility
(CPFF), in order to further support the commercial paper markets, and on
that same day the FDIC increased deposit insurance coverage to $250,000 per
depositor in an effort to reduce the run on banks by their large depositors.
On the following day the Fed authorized an additional $37.8 billion in
support of AIG.
By the end of September the international financial situation
had deteriorated to the point of desperation, and on
October 11 the Fed
removed all limitations on the size of its currency swap lines with foreign
central banks in a effort that was coordinated with other central banks to
provide unlimited dollar funding for foreign financial institutions:
In
order to provide broad access to liquidity and funding to financial
institutions, the Bank of England (BoE), the European Central Bank (ECB),
the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, and the Swiss National Bank (SNB)
are jointly announcing further measures to improve liquidity in short-term
U.S. dollar funding markets.
The
BoE, ECB, and SNB will conduct tenders of U.S. dollar funding at 7-day,
28-day, and 84-day maturities at fixed interest rates for full allotment.
Funds will be provided at a fixed interest rate, set in advance of each
operation. Counterparties in these operations will be able to borrow any
amount they wish against the appropriate collateral in each jurisdiction.
Accordingly, sizes of the reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines)
between the Federal Reserve and the BoE, the ECB, and the SNB will be
increased to accommodate whatever quantity of U.S. dollar funding is
demanded. The Bank of Japan will be considering the introduction of similar
measures.
Central banks will continue to work together and are prepared to take
whatever measures are necessary to provide sufficient liquidity in
short-term funding markets. (FRS
Cecchetti)
Then on
October 14 the FDIC
increased the protection of FDIC insured institutions "by guaranteeing newly
issued senior unsecured debt of banks, thrifts, and certain holding
companies, and by providing full coverage of non-interest bearing
deposit transaction accounts, regardless of dollar amount" (emphasis added).
It is undoubtedly worth noting that this action by the FDIC was taken
after all of the major investment banks that had contributed so greatly
to the crisis had become affiliated with depository institutions and, thus,
fell under the purview of the FDIC.
On
October 21 the Federal Reserve announced the
creation of the
Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF)
to further strengthen the MMMFs to prevent the cutoff of these funds to the
real sector of the economy, and on
October 28 and
October 29 the Federal
Reserve established currency swap lines with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
along with the central banks of several Latin American countries.
On November 17
Lincoln National,
Hartford Financial Services Group, and
Genworth Financial, three large life insurance
companies, announced their plans to purchase depository institutions in
order to qualify for
TARP funding.
And so it went throughout the fall
of 2008 and into the winter, spring, and summer of 2009 as the crisis got
worse, and it is worth noting that as the crisis got worse, it got worse in
a very predictable way:
1. As
housing prices fell and delinquencies and defaults on subprime mortgages
rose, the lead beneath the gild the financial alchemist had used to obtain
triple-A ratings for subprime MBSs and CDOs began to show through, and the
value of these securities plummeted.
2. The
fact that there were $11 trillion worth of mortgages that had been issued on
properties with inflated prices called the value of all MBSs and mortgage
related CDOs into question, not just subprime MBSs and CDOs.
3. The
fact that an economic downturn was virtually inevitable as the financial
markets attempted to sort out the subprime mortgage mess called the value of
all ABSs into question whether they were related to mortgages or not.
4. As
a result, the short-term financing that both banks and shadow banks were
using to finance their holdings of these ABSs began to dry up, and we were
faced with a situation in which financial institutions throughout the world
were about to be forced to dump literally trillions of dollars worth of ABSs
onto the market—ABSs that no one wanted to buy.
5. Given
the extraordinarily high level of debt leverage these institutions had been
allowed to accumulate, combined with the hundreds of trillions of dollars of
over-the-counter derivative contracts related to these ABSs that had been
allowed to come into being without the protections of an exchange or
clearinghouse, it was clear that if these ABSs were dumped on the market the
resulting fall in asset prices and defaults on derivative contracts would
have driven an unfathomable number of the world's financial institutions
into insolvency and caused a collapse in the financial system throughout the
entire world.
6. This,
in turn, could be expected to have the same kind of effect on the real
economy that it had in the 1930s when the collapse of the financial system
throughout the entire world drove the world's economy into the Great
Depression.
By 2008 the financial sector of the economy was in a
shambles, but until the failure of
Bear Stearns in March,
the financial crisis had relatively little effect on the lives of ordinary
people. As can be seen in Figure 10.2, the rate of unemployment had
increased gradually from its low of 4.4% of the labor force in March of 2007
to 4.9% by April of 2008 and real GDP had barely decreased.
Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Bureau of Labor Statistics
This changed with the failure of
Bear on March 14 as the rate of unemployment
accelerated, and with the failure of
Lehman Brothers on September 15 the downward
spiral of financial and real sector feedback began with a vengeance. It
didn't come to an end until the third quarter of 2009 as real GDP fell by 4%
from the second quarter of 2008 through the second quarter of 2009 and
unemployment increased from 4.9% in February of 2008 to
10.0% in October of
2009.
As we saw in Chapter 4, this is the
same kind of the problem we faced in the 1930s, but in spite of the fact
that the financial situation was much worse in 2008 than it was in 1929, the
fallout from the current financial crisis has been much less than the
fallout from the crisis that led to the Great Depression where real GDP fell
by
30% and the unemployment rate jumped from
3.2% of the labor force to
24.9%.
The fundamental difference between today and the 1930s is
that, so far at least, we have been able to minimize the fallout from the
financial crisis that began in 2007—the kind of fallout that had such
devastating effects on the economy as well as on the lives of so many people
in the 1930s. In trying to understand this difference it becomes apparent
that the only thing saving us today from the kind of devastation we went
through in the 1930s is Big Government. This may seem counterintuitive in
today’s world with so much
disparaging antigovernment rhetoric out there,
but the simple fact is, there are but three threads by which our economic
system is hanging as we work our way through the current economic crisis
that are keeping us from falling into the abyss we fell into in the 1930s,
and those three threads are there only because of the actions and the
size of our government.
The first thread by which our economic system is hanging is
the response to the crisis on the part of the Federal Reserve. By:
1. creating
lending facilities that made available hundreds of billions of dollars to
financial markets that were frozen,
2. undertaking
hundreds of billions of dollars of currency swaps with foreign central
banks, and
3. guaranteeing
trillions of dollars worth of assets against default,
the Federal Reserve (with the cooperation of the FDIC and
Treasury) was able to prevent the disaster that would have taken place if
financial institutions, either foreign or domestic, had been forced to dump
trillions of dollars of
Asset-backed Securities
onto the market in a situation in which no one wanted to buy those assets.
Through these actions, the Federal Reserve accumulated unprecedented levels
of assets on its balance sheet and made available unprecedented levels of
reserves to financial systems throughout the entire world.
The extraordinary nature of the Federal Reserve’s actions, in
this regard, is shown in Figure 10.3.
Source:
Federal Reserve Statistical Release.
Even if you do not understand how the financial
system works, it should be obvious from looking at Figure 10.3 that
something went terribly wrong back in the fall of 2008 and that the actions
taken by the Fed at that time were not only unprecedented, they were truly
desperate.
The Fed increased
Reserve Bank Credit
from $842 billion at the beginning of 2008 to $2.2 trillion at the end, and virtually all of
that increase took place in the last four months of 2008. Without these
actions taken by the Federal Reserve in 2008 our financial system most
certainly would have collapsed, and the resulting rate of unemployment most
certainly would have been far above the 10% peak reached in 2009. In
addition, because the American dollar serves as the single most important
reserve currency for international
transactions throughout the world, the collapse of our financial system
would have brought down the entire international financial system. By
providing that credit, the Fed was able to prevent a total collapse of both
our domestic and the international financial systems. (Cecchetti)
As a result, we have been able to avoid, so far at least, the kinds of
consequences suffered in the 1930s from the collapse of these systems as
described in Chapter 4, namely, a falling money supply combined with
dramatically falling wages and prices that led to the debt-deflation cycle
described by
Irving Fisher in
1932 and
1933.
The situation was much different in 1929 through
1933. As we will see in Chapter 11, while the Fed did increase its lending
to banks and its holdings of government securities by
66% during this period, it took four years
rather than four months to do so. What’s worse, because of its ideological
faith in the self-correcting nature of free markets, the Federal Reserve
actually allowed
Reserve Bank Credit to fall by
25% leading up to the banking crisis in 1930.
In addition, the Federal Reserve lacked the legal authority to intervene in
the economic system in 1933 which
Section 13(3) (12 U.S.C. §343) of the
Federal Reserve Act gave the Fed in 2008. This
authority was not available to the Fed until the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. (FRS)
To make matters worse, there was no international reserve
currency in the 1930s that could be increased to deal with the international
financial crisis that developed. There was only
gold, and, as a result,
the entire international financial system disintegrated as one country after
another was forced to abandon that system.
All of these factors combined to cause the international financial system to
collapse, more than
10,000 banks and savings institutions to go
out of business in the United States along with
129,000 other businesses, the money supply to
fall by
25%, and the economy to experience a major
deflation which exacerbated the fall in
output, income, and employment from 1929 through 1933. (Fisher
Friedman
Kindleberger
Meltzer
Skidelsky
Bernanke) It was the
bold and decisive actions of the Federal Reserve that kept these sorts of
things from happening during the current crisis.
The second thread by which our economic system is hanging
that has kept us from falling into the abyss we fell into in the 1930s is
the size of government relative to the total economy. Figure 10.4
shows Total Government Outlays from 1929 through 2013 along with
government's Direct Contribution to GDP as measured in the
National Income and Product Accounts.
Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis (1.1.5
3.1)
Total Government Outlays
increased by 22% from 2007 through 2011 during the current crisis going from
$4.5 trillion in 2007 to $5.5 trillion in 2011. This increase was the result
of 1) spending increases associated with
automatic stabilization (i.e., the mechanism whereby government
expenditures automatically increase when the economy falters and
automatically decrease when the economy booms)
caused by the economic downturn, 2) the
Economic Stimulus Act passed on February 13,
2008, and 3) the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
passed on February 17, 2009.
These actions helped to save us today because the resulting
increases in government expenditures created income for people. This had the
effect of short-circuiting the vicious downward spiral of falling income,
output, and employment that wrought such havoc
during the four years from 1929 through 1933
because the government-created income during the current crisis partially
offset the fall in incomes in the private sector of the economy. The
stability of government outlays in the face of the economic decline provided
a powerful brake on the economy as it spiraled downward during the fall of
2008 and winter of 2009. Without this brake we most certainly would have
experienced a much greater level of unemployment than the peak of
10.0% we obtained in
October 2009 following the financial system’s grinding to a halt in
September 2008.
Again, the situation was much different in 1929 through 1933
where the difference is shown in Figure 10.4 above and Figure 10.5
below.
Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis (1.1.5
3.2
3.3)
In spite of the fact that Total Government Outlays
increased by 14% from 1929 through 1933 ($8.4 billion to $9.6 billion)
Total Government Outlays were equivalent to only 8% of GDP in 1929
compared to 31% of GDP in 2007. Thus, the government's involvement in the
economy was much less in 1929 than it was in 2007, and the government sector
was not in as powerful a position to stabilize the economic system in 1929
as it was in 2007. To make matters worse, because of the ideological faith
of policy makers in the self-correcting nature of markets, the
government's Direct Contribution to GDP portion of Total
Government Outlays was actually allowed to fall by 14% from 1930 through
1933 ($10.3 billion to $8.9 billion) after the banking crisis began in 1930.
This occurred because even though the federal government's direct
contribution to GDP remained fairly constant during this period and actually
increased somewhat in 1933, this increase was more than offset by the fall
in state and local governments' direct contributions to GDP. It wasn't until
federal grants in aid to state and local governments began to increase in
1933 that the fall in state and local governments' direct contribution to
GDP came to an end.
During the current crisis, total government expenditures
increased by 20% from 2007 through 2010 as federal expenditures increased by
27% and state and local government expenditures by 7%. At the same time, the
direct contribution to GDP by the federal government increased by 24%, and
due to a 41% increase in federal grants in aid to state and local
governments, the direct contribution to GDP by state and local governments
increased by 7%. Unfortunately, the ideological opposition to this aid in
Washington has led to a
cutback in federal aid to state and local governments in recent years and to a concerted effort to reduce the size of
government. As we will see in Chapter 11,
this does not bode well for the future as it threatens to lead us down the
same disastrous path we followed in 1937.
The third thread by which our economic system is
hanging that has kept us from falling into the abyss we fell into in the
1930s—one that has been essential to keeping us from suffering the kinds of
deprivations and hardships that were so widespread in the 1930s—is the fact
that a major portion of our federal government’s budget is directly related
to social-insurance programs. These programs fall under the headings
of
Social security and railroad retirement,
Federal employees retirement and insurance,
Unemployment Assistance,
Medical Care,
Assistance to students,
Housing assistance,
Food and nutrition assistance,
Public assistance and related programs, and
All other payments for individuals in the federal budget
in the
Office of Management and Budget’s
Table 11.3—Outlays for Payments for Individuals.
Expenditures in these categories summed to
$2.3 trillion in 2010 and comprised
66% of
Total federal government outlays.
Not only did these programs provide a major
indirect contribution to GDP through the mechanism of
automatic stabilization, there can be no doubt
that the index of human misery and suffering that exists today as a result
of the economic catastrophe brought on by the fraudulent, irresponsible, and
reckless behavior of those in charge of our financial institutions
and their regulators would have been immeasurably worse had it not been for
these
$2.3 trillion worth of government social
insurance expenditures in 2010 that did not fall during this catastrophe but
actually went up. Without the:
$706.7
billion the federal government spent on
Social security and railroad retirement,
$167
billion spent on
Federal employees retirement and insurance (Military
retirement $51 billion,
Veterans service-connected compensation $43 billion,
Civil service retirement $69 Billion),
$120
billion spent on
Unemployment Assistance,
$866
billion spent on
Medical Care (Medicare
$519 billion,
Medicaid $273 billion,
Children’s health insurance $8 billion,
Military and
Veterans’ health benefits $94 billion,
Other healthcare $74 billion),
$55
billion spent on
Assistance to students (Veterans
education benefits $8 billion,
Department of Education and other $47 billion),
$50
billion on
Housing assistance,
$95
billion on
Food and nutrition assistance (SNAP
(formally
Food stamps)
$70 billion,
Child nutrition and special milk programs $16 billion,
Supplemental feeding programs
(WIC
and CSFP)
$6 billion), and
$183
billion spent on
Public assistance and related programs (Supplemental
security income $44 billion,
Family support and TANF $22 billion,
Low income home energy assistance $5 billion,
Earned income tax credit $55 billion,
Child tax credit $23 billion,
Veterans non-service connected pensions $4 billion,
Foster Care/Adoption $7 billion)
countless millions of people would not have had these
benefits to fall back on, and we would have seen an increase in human misery
and suffering as a result of the economic tragedy we have been going through
far beyond that which has actually occurred. In 2010 there were some
54 million beneficiaries in the
Social Security System
alone who would have had to face this tragedy without these benefits if it
hadn’t been for the federal government.
There was no
Social Security in 1929; no
Medicare,
Medicaid,
military, or
veterans’ health benefits; no
disability insurance or
unemployment compensation;
no food and nutrition or
housing assistance programs. When the
speculators and bankers combined to bring down the system back then people
were left on their own to fend as best they could, and the result was
suffering and misery far beyond anything we
see today. It was because of the immense personal hardship and suffering
witnessed during the
Great Depression that the federal government
was forced to step in, and the
Federal Emergency Relief administration (FERA),
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC),
Public Works Administration (PWA), and
Works Progress Administration (WPA) came into
being in the 1930s. And it was because of the immense personal hardship and
suffering witnessed during the Great Depression that the social-insurance
programs saving us today—unemployment
compensation,
Social Security,
Medicare,
Medicaid, and
food stamps—came
into being. (Kennedy
Burns)
It is important to recognize, however, that none of the
measures that have been taken so far to deal with our employment problem
have come to grips with the fundamental problem that brought us to where we
are today. Even though the fall in output and employment was reversed in
2009 and 2010, our
current account deficit had only fallen to
$400 billion by the end
of 2013, and, as can be seen in Figure 10.6, the concentration of
income in 2012 was above that of 2007, at a level comparable to that of
1928, and above where it was as the economy stagnated through the 1930s.
Source:
The World Top Incomes Database
As a result, the economic recovery that began in 2009 is far
from satisfactory. The extent to which this is so is illustrated in
Figure 10.7 which shows the dramatic increase in the Labor Force
Participation Rate that has occurred since the 1960s and how this rate
had historically reacted to changes in the Unemployment Rate—decreasing
as the Unemployment Rate increased and increasing as the
Unemployment Rate decreased.
This pattern was broken in 2010.
Source:
Bureau of Labor Statistics, (A-1).
As the Unemployment Rate increased from 4.4% of the
labor force in 2007 to 10.0% in October 2009 the Labor Force
Participation Rate fell from 66.2% to 63.2% of the population, and—unlike
economic recoveries in the past—the Labor Force Participation Rate
continued to fall from October 2009 through 2013 as the rate of unemployment
fell to 6.6% by the beginning of 2014. Most disturbing is the fact that the
Labor Force Participation Rate did not fully recover from its fall
following the
2001 recession. Undoubtedly, some of the fall in
the Labor Force Participation Rate since 2000 can be attributed to
the Baby Boomers retiring, but
certainly not all. This means that not only
were there
3.8 million more people unemployed in 2014
than in 2007, literally millions more who could not find gainful employment,
many them young people looking for their first job or displaced older
workers who could not find reemployment,
were forced out of the labor force as the Labor Force Participation Rate
fell from 67.3% of the population in 2000 to 63.2% in 2013.
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Endnotes:
The Unemployment Rate
is defined by the
BLS
as "the number unemployed as a percent of the labor force" where
the unemployed are "Persons aged 16 years and older who had no
employment during the reference week, were available for work, except
for temporary illness, and had made specific efforts to find employment
sometime during the 4-week period ending with the reference week.
Persons who were waiting to be recalled to a job from which they had
been laid off need not have been looking for work to be classified as
unemployed." The labor force "includes all [and only] persons classified
as employed or unemployed." Thus, someone who wants a job but has given
up looking for one is not classified as unemployed in BLS statistics.
The Labor
Force Participation Rate
is defined by the
BLS
as the "labor force as a percent of the civilian noninstitutional
population" where "civilian noninstitutional population" is defined as
"persons 16 years of age and older residing in the 50 States and the
District of Columbia who are not inmates of institutions (for example,
penal and mental facilities, homes for the aged), and who are not on
active duty in the Armed Forces."