A Primer on Economic Crises
Part II: The Nature of Financial Institutions
George H. Blackford © 2008/9
Most
financial institutions
(commercial
banks,
investment banks,
savings and loans,
credit unions,
insurance companies,
hedge funds,
pension funds,
etc.) act as intermediaries between borrowers and lenders who have different
objectives. In general, most lenders wish to lend for a shorter period of
time and in smaller amounts than borrowers wish to borrow. You can see how
this works by looking at a commercial bank.
When you put money in a
checking account you are in effect lending the bank a small amount of money for
a short period of time—the amount of money you deposit and the time you leave it
there until you write a check. The bank takes the small amounts of money
its depositors lend for this short period of time and makes larger loans to its
borrowers for a longer period of time, say, tens or hundreds of thousands of
dollars for 90 days or six months. They can do this because in normal
times depositors deposit money in their accounts at more or less the same rate
they take money out so even though the balances of individual accounts change
rapidly and dramatically the total amount of deposits available to the bank to
lend is relatively stable. When times are not normal, however, banks and
other financial institutions can get into trouble.
There are two ways a
financial institution (or any business or firm for
that matter) can get into trouble. One is if the value of its assets
(those things that the institution owns) is less than the value of its
liabilities
(those things that the institution owes to others). Even in normal times
this is a serious problem for a financial
institution because it means that the institution’s
net worth (the difference
between the value of what it owns, i.e., its
assets, and what it owes,
i.e., its liabilities;
net worth is also referred to as net or owner's equity or capital) is negative.
In this situation the financial institution is
insolvent, and
even if it liquidates (sells) all of its
assets it will not be
able to pay all that it owes to others. When a financial institution is
insolvent it is in real trouble and is in danger of being forced to close its
doors.
The other way a financial
institution can get into trouble is if it has a
liquidity
or cash flow problem. When there is a net cash flow out of a financial
institution this generally means its financial obligations to others are coming
due, and it must meet these obligations with cash. If it doesn't have cash
available to meet these obligations, for example to meet its payroll or make a
payment on a loan it will default on its payments and, again, is in danger of
being forced out of business. When financial institutions do not have
enough cash on hand to meet their obligations they must either borrow money
(hence, keep their total liabilities from
falling by creating a new liability) or, if necessary, they must sell off some
of their
assets to obtain the cash they need.
In normal times the
financial system as a whole is able to handle the liquidity and solvency
problems of individual institutions with relative ease, but there is a
vulnerability that is inherent in the very nature of financial institutions (and
to some extent in the nature of most businesses and firms) that arises from the
fact that, in general, their
assets have a
longer term to maturity than do their
liabilities.
You can see how this works in your bank.
Your deposit is a
short-term loan to your bank that it owes to you and hence is its liability.
The bank makes a loan with the money it gets from you for a specific period of
time in the future, say 90 days, and this loan becomes its asset, something the
bank owns. The bank’s loan from you is on demand, that is, its term to
maturity (period of time until the date your loan matures and your bank must pay
it back to you) is zero since the bank must pay back your loan at your demand
while the term to maturity of the loan the bank makes is 90 days.
This means that the very
existence of a financial institution depends on the confidence lenders have in
the institution. If lenders lose confidence in an institution, new lenders
will refuse to lend to it, and old lenders will refuse to renew their loans when
they come due. In the case of your bank, new depositors will choose other
banks, and old depositors will close their accounts. In this situation
your bank will be forced to pay out cash to pay off its depositors, and when it
can’t get the cash from new depositors it will be forced to liquidate its
assets by selling them off to meet the demands of its
depositors. It will be forced out of existence if it is insolvent in this
situation, that is, if its net worth is negative. What's more, even if
it is solvent before depositors lose confidence in it, it can be made insolvent
after depositors lose confidence if it is forced to sell off its
assets
at fire-sale prices that are below what its
assets
are actually worth.
This inherent
vulnerability to the confidence of lenders not only applies to individual
financial institutions; it extends to the financial system itself. The
reason is financial institutions are interconnected and interdependent in
innumerable ways. To a very large extent the assets
and
liabilities of
one financial institution are the liabilities
and
assets of other financial institutions.
When you deposit money in your bank the bank agrees to pay you back the
principal plus interest (if any) on the terms the bank sets for your account.
That deposit is your asset, something you own, and the bank’s liability,
something it owes. Your bank takes your money, combines it with the money
of other depositors, loans the money to someone to buy a house and takes a
mortgage on
the house which becomes your bank’s asset and the homeowner's liability.
Your bank then sells the mortgage to an
investment bank
and it becomes the investment bank's asset and the money your bank gets from the
investment bank becomes its asset which it can use to make more loans.
The investment bank
combines the mortgage it got from your bank with mortgages it got from other
banks and uses these mortgages as collateral for Mortgage Backed Securities (MBSs).
These securities (mortgage bonds) are given a rating by a
credit rating agency
(such as
Standard and Poor’s,
Moody’s, or
Fitch
Ratings) and are then sold to other
financial institutions such as pension funds and insurance company—perhaps, even
to your pension fund or life insurance company or the pension fund or insurance
company of the mortgagee who borrowed the money in the first place.
At the same time the
investment bank insures its mortgage assets
against default by purchasing a Credit Default Swap (CDS)
from a hedge fund or an insurance company. This
CDS becomes a
kind of
contingent asset
for the investment bank, its value being
contingent on the extent to which there is a default on one of the mortgages
that it insures, and a
contingent liability
of the hedge fund or insurance company that sold the
CDS where this
liability is contingent on the same conditions as the investment bank's
contingent asset. At this point the investment bank
holds your mortgage and the mortgages of others as assets
and the Mortgage Backed Securities (MBSs)
that it sold are its liabilities.
The
MBSs that are purchased by pension funds and
insurance companies are their assets. The
investment bank also gained money, an asset, from its
sale of
MBSs, and this
money can now be used to purchase more mortgages.
This example should give
you some idea how financial institutions are interconnected and interdependent,
but even this example is highly simplified. Banks, mortgage companies,
hedge funds,
and insurance companies all issue stock to finance themselves. These
institutions also borrow from banks, issue
commercial paper,
and sell
bonds and
interact with financial institutions via the markets for these financial
instruments. In addition, they borrow and lend directly from and to each
other in order to meet their liquidity needs as their cash receipt and
expenditure flows change on a day by day basis. And we haven’t even
touched on the role of the
Federal Reserve
and the US
Treasury in the financial system.
The financial system is
like a huge spider web that folds back on itself in ways that are beyond
imagination, and this simple example doesn't even come close to indicating its
full complexity and interconnectedness. What’s more, its complexity and
interconnectedness not only includes domestic financial institutions, it is
international in scope encompassing the financial institutions of foreign
countries, their central banks and treasuries, the
International Monetary Fund, the
Bank for International Settlements, and the
World
Bank. And all this system is dealing
with is assets
and
liabilities that are nothing more than obligations
to pay interests, principals, benefits, premiums, etc. at particular points in
time.
I can’t emphasize this
enough: All this system is dealing with is obligations, promises,
contracts, or agreements that define the times and amounts that payments of
money are to be made in the future.
When the system works
properly, everyone benefits from this process. In the simple example
above, you benefit by having a convenient place to keep your cash to facilitate
your expenditures, a higher yielding investment opportunity for your pension
fund, and lower rates on your insurance policies. The home owner benefits
from the ability to get a mortgage at a lower rate than she would have been able
to if the bank were forced to tie up its assets
with a long-term, illiquid mortgage that it couldn’t sell very easily if it
needed cash. The home owner also gains the same pension fund and insurance
benefits you do. The investment bank
benefits because by securitizing the pool of mortgages it can issue an
equivalent amount of mortgage bonds (MBSs)
on which it pays a lower rate of interest than it receives from the pool of
mortgages it has purchased.
The hedge fund that
insured this pool of mortgages by selling a
CDS
benefits because it can earn an income from the insurance it sells, and the
investment bank benefits from this insurance by
being insured against a loss on the mortgages it holds. The pension funds
and life insurance companies that purchase these Mortgage Backed Securities
benefit because they are able to purchase long-term, high yielding assets
that are both ‘safe,’ because they are collateralized by real estate, and liquid
because the market for Mortgage Backed Securities is much more liquid than is
the market for individual mortgages. And everyone benefits from the credit
rating agencies that perform due diligence in investigating and reporting on the
quality of the Mortgage Backed Securities that are sold in the markets, thus
providing a valuable source of information to investors and making the market
more efficient.
Everyone benefits from
this process so long as it works properly. When it doesn’t work properly,
however, there is a chain reaction throughout the system that can shake the
system to its core if it is allowed to get out of control.
Note that in the example
above it is assumed that all of the future payments of money that the
participants are obligating themselves to pay will be financed out of the
payments made by the homeowner. The homeowner makes interest and principle
payments to the investment bank, out of which
the investment bank pays interest payments to the pension fund and insurance
premiums to the hedge fund, out of which the pension and
hedge funds
pay their pensioners and investors.
What if the homeowner
defaults on the mortgage? If the homeowner defaults then the hedge fund
that sold the
CDS
that insured the mortgage must pay. If the hedge fund defaults on its
CDS,
then the investment bank that holds the
mortgages must pay. If the investment bank
defaults on its Mortgage Backed Securities then the pension funds and insurance
companies that purchased the Mortgage Backed Securities don’t get paid, and if
the loss is sufficiently large they may default on their obligations to their
pensioners and policy holders, and the pensioners and policy holders who are the
ultimate lenders in this example must ultimately take the loss.
But the disruption to the
system does not stop here. As was noted above, banks,
hedge funds,
mortgage companies, pension funds, and insurance companies all borrow from other
financial institutions. If one of these institutions defaults on its
obligations it will be forced out of business. All of the loans that are
its
liabilities are
held as
assets by the institutions that lent to
it. Since these assets are now at
risk investors and lenders everywhere will begin to look at the
liabilities of the failed institution to see what
institutions hold its
liabilities as assets
to see how the failure of the given institution will affect the viability of the
institutions that lent to the failed institution.
This is why lenders
must have confidence the obligations, promises, contracts, and agreements
that are the essence of the financial system will be honored. If lenders
lose confidence in the ability of a particular institution to meet its
obligations lenders will stop lending to it, and that institution will be forced
out of business. This sets in motion a chain of events, often referred to
as
contagion,
which brings into question other financial institutions in the system. In
normal times this process works itself out with very little difficulty, but we
do not have normal times. If the financial institution that fails is a
major player in the system (‘too big to fail’) or if a large number of smaller
institutions begin to fail (through a process referred to as contagion) the
system itself is threatened, and once lenders lose confidence in the system
itself the entire system simply grinds to a halt.
This is no small matter
because as the process of resolving this situation works itself out there are
huge amounts of wealth that are at stake, and the economic wellbeing of everyone
is at risk.
As was noted above,
the
immediate cause of the financial crisis was the bursting of the
housing bubble that had been building for the past
seven years brought about by 1) deregulating the financial system, 2) what was
either duplicity or stupidity on the part of securitizers and rating agencies,
and 3) a failure to stop
predatory lending practices on the part of
mortgage originators. (Andrews)
Now that we have examined the nature of financial institutions, we are in a
position to understand why the bursting of the housing bubble caused so much
turmoil even though only a small percentage of mortgages, 2% or 3%, were in
default at the beginning of the crisis.
The defaulted mortgages
had been
securitized by including them in combined
mortgages (MBSs),
insured by Credit Default Swaps, and then spread throughout the financial
system. To make things worse, financial institutions have been allowed to
speculate in unregulated markets on
CDSs by allowing them to buy and sell
CDSs
for Mortgage Backed Securities, for
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) (which
are combinations of lesser rated
MBSs),
and other Asset Backed Securities that the buyer of the
CDSs
doesn’t own.
This practice had grown to
the point where the value of the
contingent liabilities created by these Credit
Default Swap on the books of financial institutions are often five or ten times
the value of the Asset Backed Securities they insure. What’s more
financial institutions have been allowed to treat
ABSs
in such a way that they can be hidden in their
financial statements, and the way in which these securities have been put
together it is difficult if not impossible to know what these financial
assets are made up of or to evaluate the degree
of risk that should be associated with them to the effect that it is impossible
to know what these assets are actually
worth. (Kroszner)
The result was that no one
knew at the time of the crash in 2008—and no one knows today—who owns the bad
mortgages or the
contingent liabilities and assets
created when these mortgages were combined into Mortgage Backed Securities (MBSs)
and other Asset Backed Securities and insured innumerable times with Credit
Default Swap, let alone who owns the financial obligations of those institutions
who own these toxic assets. This lack of
knowledge (often referred to as
a lack of
transparency) undermines the confidence of lenders
in all financial institutions since no one knows which of these institutions are
at risk and which are not.
What’s more, as we head
into a recession and housing prices fall further there is no guarantee the
percentage of mortgages in default won’t go from 2% to 4% to 8% to 16% to 32% as
this problem works itself out. In fact, it is clear that this percentage
is going to increase over time. (Yang)
The only question is by how much. As a result,
CDSs,
MBSs,
CDOs, and other Asset Backed Securities have
become known as ‘toxic
assets’ and lenders are afraid to lend to any
financial institution that might have an association, either directly or
indirectly, with them.
This situation, combined
with the wanton deregulation of the financial system that has taken place over
the past 30 years (which accelerated dramatically under the Clinton Era and
Republican Congress in the 1990s) (RiskGlossary)
and the deplorable lack of enforcement of existing regulations under the Bush
Administration for the past seven years, has led to a financial system that is a
house of cards.
Deregulation has allowed
many of the major players in the financial markets to
leverage
themselves (increase the ratio of their liabilities
to their net worth) to the point that their net worth may be as little as 2% or
3% of their total assets. (Gandel)
This means that a very small decrease in the value of their assets
(2% or 3%) will make them insolvent, and there is a very serious possibility
that these institutions will not be able to meet their financial obligations at
some time in the near future.
To see how central the
increase in leverage is to the current financial crisis
assume you have $1,000 and decide to become an investment
banker:
-
If you lend your $1,000 out at 6% you
can earn $60 a year.
($1,000x.06=$60) That gives you a
6% return on your $1,000 investment.
-
If instead of just lending your money
you borrow $1,000 from a friend at 5%
and lend out the $2,000 at 6% you can
then take in $120 that cost you $50 in
interest to your friend. This
leaves you $70 profit which is a return
of 7% on your investment of $1,000
instead of 6%. This extra 1% was
obtained by leveraging you capital at a
1 to 1 ratio with your friend’s money.
-
Suppose you have enough friends to
borrow $10,000 at 5% and are able to
lend $11,000 out at 6%. You have
now leveraged your capital at 10 to 1
and can take in $660 that cost you $500.
This leaves you a $160 profit which is a
return of 16% on your $1,000 investment.
But why stop here?
-
If you leverage your capital at 30 to 1
by borrowing $30,000 at 5% and lend the
$31,000 out at 6% you take in $1,860
that costs you $1,500 which leaves you a
$360 profit. You end up with a
return of 36% on your $1,000 worth of
capital.
This is what leverage is
all about: It increases the rate of return on the
capital of financial institutions, and using this kind of
reckless leverage and worse has allowed some of our largest
financial institutions to make hundreds of billions of
dollars over the last few years as the housing bubble grew.
At the same time this
leverage increased the instability of the financial system
as a whole. If, as in the above example, you are
leveraged 30 to 1 all it takes is a 3.2% loss in your
$31,000 worth of assets and your net worth is zero.
That is, your $1,000 worth of capital that represents what
you invested of your own money is completely wiped out.
What’s more,
if all of the institutions in the financial sector are
leveraged at a 30 to 1 ratio and the value of the total
assets held in this sector fall just 3.2% all of the
net worth in the entire financial system will, in effect, be
wipe out. Some institutions may have a positive
net worth that is offset by some that have a negative net
worth, but the net worth in the financial system as a whole
will be zero.
Even though there is not
necessarily a liquidity problem at this point (in the above
example you have only lost $60 of the $1,860 income you were
making before the default and are still only paying out
$1,500 thus making a $300 annual profit) there soon will be
because this is the kind of situation that makes lenders
nervous. The handwriting is on the wall so to speak.
When a large number of
financial institutions find themselves in this situation the
entire system is at risk. Since most financial
institutions borrow short and lend long, as loans to them
come due lenders will be less willing to renew their loans
at current rates of interest. Rates of interest that
insolvent institutions must pay will begin to increase, and
they will inevitably run out of cash at some point and be
forced to sell off assets to meet their cash flow
needs. The prices of these assets will fall
making the situation worse, and, in the end, lenders are
going to stop lending and the entire system is going to
collapse.
This is, more or less,
how we got to where we were in September of 2008.
Reasonable leverage is essential for the financial system to
function efficiently. Reckless leverage, however, is
disastrous for the system.
Given the failure
of
Bear Stearns,
Lehman Brothers,
Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac,
and
AIG in
September of 2008 we found that lenders had lost confidence
in the financial system itself and had been driven into a
panic. As a result of this panic it was virtually
impossible for financial institutions to borrow money or to
sell their
assets at prices
that would keep them from becoming insolvent because there
were no lenders or investors out there who were willing to
assume the risk of lending financial institutions money or
of buying their assets at prices that would not force
them out of business. This caused the financial system
to grind to a halt.
In the meantime, since
most financial institutions lend for a longer term than they
borrow the liabilities of financial institutions continue to
mature at a faster rate than their assets, exacerbating
their liquidity and solvency problems, and the entire system
found itself in the process of collapsing. It would
have made no difference if the fundamentals of the economy
were sound which, unfortunately, they were not. All
that mattered was that lenders no longer had confidence in
the financial system and were refusing to lend to financial
institutions.
What’s more, since our
financial system is interconnected with the financial
systems of the rest of the world, many of the assets
and liabilities of our financial institutions are the
liabilities and assets
of foreign financial institutions which put foreign
financial institutions at risk as well. As a result,
we were faced with a worldwide financial crisis. (Kodres)
Unfortunately, the
story of the Crash of 2008 does not end with simply a crisis among our
financial institutions because the financial sector of the economy is
inextricably intertwined with the real sector of the economy.
The financial sector amounts to something like ten
percent of the economy. Ninety percent of the economy is in the
nonfinancial or real sector. This is the sector that produces
nonfinancial, real goods and services: real consumer goods that provide
the food and clothing and shelter that are used to satisfy consumers’ wants
and needs, and real investment goods that provide the tools, machines, and
buildings that are used to produce economic goods. It is the real sector
of the economy that is the ultimate engine that produces the economic goods
that are essential to our wellbeing and, indeed, to our very survival.
Without the real sector the financial sector has no reason to exist and,
indeed, cannot exist. At the same time, in a modern economy a
functioning financial sector is essential to the efficient functioning of the
real sector.
The real sector of the economy is made up of firms
(businesses) and households (individuals and families): Firms purchase
labor from households and produce goods that are sold to households as well as
to other firms. Households sell their labor to firms and purchase goods
from firms. These purchases and sales are made possible by a circular
flow of money through the economy from households to firms and back to
households. The money used by firms to purchase labor from households is
also used by households to purchase goods from firms, and is, in turn, used by
firms to purchase labor from households. In the industrialized economies
of the world
this circular flow of money is the mechanism by which income payments are
made by firms and received by households. As a result, the financial
sector of the economy is essential to the real sector of the economy in that
the financial sector coordinates the circular flow of money from firms to
households back to firms in such a way as to finance the purchases and sales
of households and firms.
When individuals receive income payments from firms
a portion of the money they receive is spent directly on products sold by
firms and a portion is not spent on these products. That portion that is
generally lent to a financial institution in the form of a payment to an
insurance company, a contribution to a pension fund, a deposit in an
investment account or some other financial institution, or it is just left in
the checking account where the check that represents the income payment is
deposited. When the money is lent to the financial system it is
available to be lent to others, both firms and households alike, to balance
out their income and expenditure flows.
This makes it possible for a firm to make
expenditures on payrolls, inventories, buildings, and equipment that exceed
the amount of money it has on hand by going to the financial system to borrow
the difference to finance its expenditures and then repay the loan from the
income it expects to generate from its expenditures. Similarly, this
makes it possible for a household to make expenditures on food, clothing,
washing machines, cars, and to purchase a home that exceed the amount of money
it has on hand by going to the financial system to borrow the difference to
finance its expenditures and then repay the loan from the income it expects to
earn in the future.
The circular flow of money from households to firms
back to households is possible only if the financial sector of the economy is
functioning properly, and a loss of confidence in the financial system that
causes the financial sector to no longer function properly has a direct effect
on the real sector. As households and firms become less willing to lend
to the financial system, the financial sector must contract. As the
financial sector contracts financial institutions become less willing to lend
to households and firms, and households and firms find themselves more and
more limited in their expenditures by the amount of money they have on hand.
Non-financial firms
have the same kinds of liquidity and solvency problems that financial
institutions do. In general, their assets are longer term and earn
income over a longer period of time than their obligations to make payments to
manage their liabilities. As firms find it more difficult to borrow they
also find it more difficult to meet their payrolls and fund their other
expenditures. As the situation gets worse they are forced to cut back
their expenditures, reduce their levels of production, and lay people off.
In addition, if the inability to borrow gets bad enough, otherwise solvent
firms can be forced to sell off their assets at fire-sale prices and can be
forced out of business in the same way that otherwise solvent financial
institutions can be forced to sell off their assets and go out of business.
As firms lay people off and go out of business the
incomes of households fall, and households, in turn, find themselves
restricted in their ability to make expenditures. Households are forced
to cut back on their purchases of goods from firms, which has a feedback
effect on firms that increases their liquidity problems and forces more firms
to lay people off and go out of business, which has a feedback effect on
households. As employment and incomes fall there is tremendous
pressure on wages and prices to fall as well.
A contraction in the real sector of the economy, in
turn, has a feedback effect on the financial sector. As employment and
incomes fall, firms go out of business, and wages and prices fall in the real
sector, not only does the willingness and, indeed, the ability of this sector
to lend to the financial sector also fall, it becomes more and more difficult
for households and firms to honor their existing obligations to the financial
sector: Firms find it more difficult to pay off their loans, make
interest and principal payments on their bonds, (Kouwe)
maintain the value of their stocks, or to make dividend payments to their
stockholders. Households find it more difficult to make payments on
their loans, credit cards and other installment debts, and to make payments on
their mortgages.
These financial obligations of firms and households
provide the very foundation of the financial sector of the economy, without
which there is no reason for the financial system even to exist. It is
faith in the ability of firms and households in the real sector to meet their
financial obligations to the financial sector that ultimately underlies the
confidence in the financial sector itself because ultimately all of the income
earned in the financial sector of the economy must come from the real sector
of the economy.
As this process unfolds we find ourselves in a
vicious circle: A lack of confidence in the financial sector causes a
reduction in the willingness of this sector to lend to the real sector, which
causes the real sector to contract and default on its obligations to the
financial sector, which increases the lack of confidence in the financial
sector which feeds back on the real sector. The result is a downward
spiral with more and more firms and financial institutions going out of
business and more and more people losing their jobs, losing their homes, and
going into bankruptcy. This downward spiral must continue until either
confidence in the financial sector is restored or the economy contracts to the
point where virtually all expenditures by households and firms that survive in
the real sector are made with the cash they have on hand. At this point
the financial sector will be more or less irrelevant except to the extent that
banks—whose checking deposit are the primary form of money in use
today—survive, since the real sector of the economy will be functioning on a
cash only basis.
Thus, if the financial crisis is allowed to get out
of control, the end result will be the failure of innumerable firms in both
the real and financial sectors and significant increases in the number of
households, that is to say people who will lose their jobs, their cars,
their homes, their businesses, and their life’s savings. In addition,
there will be massive transfers of wealth from those who are crushed in this
downward spiral of the economic system to those who are able to survive,
mostly by holding US Treasury obligations and watching the carnage unfold from
the sidelines as they wait until they are ready to convert their
assets to
cash and buy up the real and financial
assets of
firms and households at fire-sale prices.
Part III:
Bailing out the Financial System